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Organismal Natures1
Devin Henry
As other contributions to this volume show, biological substances are at 
the heart of Aristotle’s ontology. Within this ontology the natures of or-
ganisms play the central explanatory role (cf. Physics II and, esp., Parts 
of Animals). In several places throughout the corpus Aristotle draws 
our attention to the fact organismal natures are complex things. The 
nature of a living thing is divided into its material nature and its formal 
nature. The formal nature is identifi ed with the substantial being (ou-
sia) of a thing, which Aristotle divides into nature understood as mover 
and nature understood as end. This complex structure (as well as its 
explanatory import) is set out explicitly in a key passage from Parts of 
Animals I 1:
The natural scientist will state both what the soul or that very part of 
the soul is, and speak about the attributes it has in virtue of the sort of 
being it is, especially since the nature of something is spoken of and is 
in two ways: as matter and as substantial being (ousia). And nature as 
substantial being is both nature as mover (hôs hê kinousa) and nature 
as end (hôs to telos). And it is the soul — either the whole soul or some 
part of it — that is of this sort in the case of animals. So in this way 
 1 The original version of this paper was read at the Boston Colloquium in the Philoso-
phy of Science (Boston University, January 22, 2007). Subsequent evolutions arose 
from discussions at the Second and Third Workshop on Aristotle’s Generation of 
Animals (University of Pittsburgh, May 2007; November 2007). I am especially 
grateful to the participants of those workshops, especially Allan Gotthelf, Jim Len-
nox, and Jessica Gelber. I am also grateful to Peter Adamson, Ron Polansky, Jim 
Hankinson, Riin Sirkel, and Mariska Luenissen who commented on earlier drafts. 
Finally, I would like to thank John Mouracade and the participants at the Alaska 
Workshop (especially my commentator Margaret Scharle) for allowing me to pres-
ent my ideas and challenging me to think harder about the issues involved.
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it will be requisite for the person studying nature to speak about the 
soul more than the matter, inasmuch as it is more that the matter is na-
ture because of soul than the reverse; for indeed the wood is a bed or 
a stool because it is potentially these things. (641a22-33 Lennox trans. 
with modifi cations)
In this paper I want to explore the concept of organismal natures as it is 
deployed in Aristotle’s biological writings, in particular the role nature 
plays in the account of animal generation. For it is here that nature’s 
teleological aspect is most on display.
Galen’s Criticism
Historically, not everyone accepted the Aristotelian appeal to natures. 
Most famously among Aristotle’s critics was Galen. In Chapter 6 of On 
the Construction of the Embryo Galen complains that to describe devel-
opment as a process caused by ‘nature’ amounts to nothing more than 
a platitude: ‘Surely everyone will recognize that there is such a thing 
as the cause of the formation of the embryo and that we all call this 
cause ‘nature’ but without knowing its substance’ (§687).2 For Galen, 
the only satisfying answer one could give to the question, What forms 
the organism?, would be one that takes the craftsman analogy literally 
and says that the entire process is under the guidance of some kind of 
intelligence that operates with a view to the end (§683, §701). In raising 
this objection Galen seems to have the Aristotelian and Stoic theories of 
biological generation squarely in mind.
Whatever the Stoics believe, Aristotle certainly agrees with the nega-
tive conclusion of Galen’s overall project that the growth and devel-
opment of living things cannot be due to material-forces operating 
according to chance (the key premise in Galen’s Design Argument, e.g. 
De usu partium XI, §7-8). For Aristotle, the process of development is 
structured according to the form of the organism being generated by it. 
Development, he insists, ‘follows upon’ (akolouthei) the organism’s sub-
stantial being and exists for the sake of it rather than vice versa (GA V 1, 
778b5-7). This confers a certain order and direction on the process that 
cannot be accounted for in terms of the random motions of atoms (Dem-
 2 This paper has benefi ted greatly from Hankinson (unpublished draft).
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ocritus) or the undirected actions of Love and Strife (Empedocles). Ar-
istotle accepts that natural generation involves material-level forces of 
the sort Democritus proposed (GA V 8, 789b2-15; see below); however, 
he insists that when operating by themselves these undirected causes 
would only produce a living thing by chance. And generation is far too 
regular for that (Physics II 8). But Aristotle rejects the further inference 
— endorsed by Galen — that the teleological structure imposed on a 
developing organism must be traced to an intelligent agent that puts 
the organism together according to its end like some kind of internal-
ized Demiurge. Nature, Aristotle says, does not deliberate (Physics II 8, 
199b26-30). Galen’s criticism is directed against just this sort of claim. 
By invoking ‘natures’ as the cause of development, Galen says, Aristo-
tle offers an account which is entirely vacuous. 
On the other hand, Denis Walsh has recently argued that the concept 
of Aristotelian natures plays the same role in development as the mod-
ern concept of phenotypic plasticity and that in this sense Aristotelian 
natures have an indispensable role to play contemporary evolutionary 
biology.3 However, if Galen is right, then the Aristotelian approach to 
teleology is not possible within the context of modern biology. While 
grounding such an account in the concept of organismal natures might 
avoid the spectre of intelligent design, that concept (Galen charges) is 
itself non-explanatory. My aim in this paper is not to defend an Aristo-
telian approach to modern biology but rather to explore the concept of 
organismal natures in the context of Aristotle’s teleology. Before doing 
so, however, I want to offer a brief response to Galen’s charge to show 
that Aristotle’s concept of nature is not vacuous and non-explanatory. 
This is important, since Aristotle’s natural teleology is grounded in his 
concept of organismal natures.
Organismal natures
On closer inspection, Galen’s criticism of Aristotle misses its mark. For 
it underestimates the explanatory resources available to him. What Ga-
len had failed to grasp about Aristotle’s developmental biology is that 
 3 Walsh 2006. See also Gutiérrez-Giraldo 2001. For a contemporary defense of natu-
ral teleology in contemporary biology see Mayr 1992 (who also defends a limited 
appeal to Aristotelian ‘natures’), Lennox 1992, Ayala 1998, Vinci and Robert 2005, 
and the references in Bedau 1992.
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there is an important sense in which references to a thing’s ‘nature’ are 
not explanatorily basic. In a number of places Aristotle hints at the idea 
that organismal natures can be analyzed in terms of the more funda-
mental theory of dunameis or causal powers. For example, in Metaphys-
ics Θ (where Aristotle sets out his theory of causal powers) we are told 
that nature is a kind of dunamis because it is a source of change, though 
not in another thing (as dunamis was originally defi ned in Θ 1), but in 
the thing itself qua itself (1049b9-11). Again, in GA II 4, Aristotle explic-
itly refers to a thing’s nature as the ‘poiousa dunamis’ that is responsible 
for constructing its parts in the very beginning (740b35). So it seems 
that talk of ‘natures’ can be translated into talk of dunameis or causal 
powers. In order to understand how nature can be an effi cient cause of 
development, then, one must fi rst understand something about Aristo-
tle’s theory of causal powers.
According to Metaphysics Θ 1, a dunamis is a power or capacity for 
acting or being acted upon. These correspond to active and passive du-
nameis, respectively. Active dunameis are the powers that causal agents 
have for effecting changes, while passive dunameis are the correspond-
ing powers things have for being changed by those agents. To take a 
simple example, we would explain the process of fi re melting iron by 
reference to two sets of powers: the passive power of the iron in vir-
tue of which it is potentially molten, and the active power of the fi re 
in virtue of which it is capable of melting iron (or anything with the 
corresponding passive power). When these two substances come into 
contact under the right causal conditions, their powers are immediately 
activated by one another resulting in the iron becoming molten.
Allan Gotthelf has argued that explanations in terms of dunameis are 
basic for Aristotle and play the same role in his system as explanations 
in terms of natural laws do in contemporary science.4 For Aristotle, a 
change is explained when it is shown to be the result of the mutual acti-
vation of a pair of causal powers. What I am suggesting is that explana-
tions in terms of causal powers are more fundamental than reference 
to organismal natures, since organismal natures are themselves a kind 
of dunamis. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that Aristotle’s 
 4 Gotthelf 1987, 209-212. Gotthelf himself takes phusis and dunamis to be distinct 
concepts which are not reducible to one another (personal communication). But 
he accepts that dunamis can have a broad and narrow sense and that phusis is a 
dunamis in the broad sense of a ‘source of change’ (the narrow sense being ‘source 
of change in another or in itself qua other’).
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talk of nature as the cause of development is not empty and vacuous. 
On the contrary, it gives way to a deeper explanation in terms of the 
more fundamental theory of causal powers. It is the theory of causal 
powers itself that provides the scientifi c account of how exactly an em-
bryo is transformed into an organism one in form with its generating 
parents.5
At this point one might object that the theory of causal powers does 
not rescue Aristotle from Galen’s objection. For one might complain 
here that there is little difference between the virtus dormitiva of opium 
(in Molière’s famous example) and the dunameis to which Aristotle ap-
peals in his explanation of biological development.6 And it is typically 
believed that such virtus dormitiva explanations are not explanations at 
all.
It isn’t at all clear what this objection amounts to. I can see at least 
fi ve possible readings:
1. Appealing to causal powers or capacities is just not explana-
tory at all.
2. Appealing to causal powers or capacities is not a good explana-
tion because it allows us to explain anything by simply identi-
fying a power to cause that thing.7
3. The theory of causal powers invokes mysterious and occult 
entities.8
4. Saying that certain things cause certain effects because they 
have the power to cause those effects is vacuous because it is 
just a redescription of the explanandum.9
5. Explaining certain changes (e.g., my falling asleep) by refer-
ring to the capacity of certain things to cause those changes 
 5 For the depth of the explanatory power of Aristotle’s theory of causal powers see 
Meteorologica IV. See also Lennox (unpublished draft).
 6 Morsink 1982, 155. This objection is also raised by Hankinson (npage) and Scharle 
(personal communication) and is freely admitted by Lear (1991, 23-4).
 7 Morsink 1982, 155.
 8 This objection seems to originate in Hume.
 9 This is how Molière poses the objection in Le Malade imaginaire. Here the explanan-
dum is the fact that opium causes sleep. This differs from the next reading where 
the explanadum is the fact that I fall asleep.
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(e.g., opium’s capacity to induce sleep) is vacuous because the 
explananda includes reference to the explanandum.
If the charge is 2, then it has no force against Aristotle. In supporting 
the theory of causal powers Aristotle is not thereby committed to the 
view that all one needs to do in order to explain something is to in-
vent a power to do whatever it is we want explained. Aristotle would 
surely agree that one must have good scientifi c evidence for claiming 
that a thing has a dunamis for producing whatever effect it is claimed to 
produce. Charge 3 also has little or no force. For such capacities need 
not be ‘mysterious’ or ‘occult’ entities. Whether or not something has a 
certain causal power is the sort of thing that can be measured and veri-
fi ed empirically.10
If 1 is the charge, then it is just false from the perspective of mod-
ern science. There is a line of thought in contemporary philosophy of 
science that says that a good causal explanation requires reference to 
the ‘capacities’ or ‘powers’ of things.11 This is the main thesis of Nancy 
Cartwright’s infl uential book Nature’s Capacities and their Measurements. 
Cartwright holds: ‘Science is measurement; capacities can be measured; 
and science cannot be understood without them.’12 She rejects the Hu-
mean picture of causation as well as the covering-law models of Hem-
pel and Nagel. Instead she holds that ‘our typical methodologies and 
our typical applications, both in the natural sciences and the social sci-
ences, belong to a world governed by capacities, and indeed cannot 
be made sense of without them.’13 The general causal claims of science 
according to this view are not reports of mere regularities or constant 
conjunctions but ascriptions of capacities, capacities to make things hap-
pen. And these capacities constitute the natures of things.
This seems especially true in developmental biology. Developmen-
tal biologists often attempt to explain certain phenomena by fi nding 
‘mechanisms’ — mechanisms for controlling gene expression, post-
transcriptional mechanisms that play supporting roles in the control 
of gene expression, mechanisms for pattern formation, and so forth. 
These causal explanations do not collapse into talk of a mere constant 
10 See Cartwright 1989.
11 I am grateful to Jim Lennox for drawing my attention to this possibility.
12 Cartwright 1989, 1
13 Cartwright 1989, 1-2
Organismal Natures 53
conjunction of events but of things (‘mechanisms’) having the capacities 
to produce certain changes.
So causal explanations that appeal to capacities or powers are po-
tentially explanatory from the perspective of modern science. This is 
precisely what makes Aristotle’s developmental biology scientifi cally 
respectable, whereas it would not be if he were to simply talk of ‘natures’ 
without the theory of causal powers in the background. Of course mod-
ern biologists still look to discover the molecular structures that ground 
the developmental capacities of embryos. But causal statements that in-
clude reference to such capacities are nonetheless taken to be explana-
tory in themselves. In that case, we might say that Aristotle’s account 
of generation in terms of the developmental capacities of organisms is 
explanatory; it is just not fully explanatory according to our modern 
standards. For we demand a further explanation about the molecular 
structures that ground those causal powers. But note that the appeal 
to causal powers is still explanatory nonetheless; it isn’t vacuous. To 
see it as non-explanatory is to misunderstand what one demands of an 
explanation, especially what Aristotle demands.
Some have defended Aristotle against this version of the vacuity 
charge by saying that in Aristotle’s world there simply is no deeper level 
of facts to move to while the vacuuity charge presupposes that there is 
some further level to be reached.14 So an appeal to causal powers is not 
only explanatory for Aristotle, it is fully explanatory. For an appeal to 
causal powers is explanatory bedrock for him. I don’t think this is right. 
Aristotle agrees with modern science that the causal powers of organ-
isms are realized in some kind of material structure. PA II 1 introduces 
us to a hierarchical picture where the increasingly complex capacities 
of animals are grounded in their lower-level material base. However, it 
is argued that, in living things at least, the lower-level material base is 
organized for the sake of the higher-level capacities it supports rather 
than vice versa. for example, in Generation of Animals Book V we are 
told that the capacity of the eye to detect small differences in colour is 
dependent on the clarity of the fl uid it contains; the clearer the fl uid, the 
sharper the animal’s vision (779b13-81a12). The clarity of the fl iud itself 
is in turn dependent on some combination of pneuma and water, both of 
which give rise to clarity. In this way, an investigation into the power of 
the eye to detect small differences in colour reveals certain lower-level 
14 See, e.g., Morsink 1982, 155-61; Lear 1991, 23-4.
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material facts about the structure of the eye that support that capac-
ity. However, Aristotle will insist that in the development of the eye 
that particular combination of pneuma and water was produced for the 
sake of vision and not vice versa. In Aristotle’s language, that particular 
combination of pneuma and water is conditionally necessary for sharp 
vision. So capacities for Aristotle actually explain, in a teleological way, 
their lower-level material base, not the other way around. In this sense 
capacities are explanatory bedrock, but not because there is no further 
level of facts to be reached.
This leaves readings 4 and 5. If 4 is the charge, then it is clearly an 
objection, but it is not an objection against Aristotle. The explanadum of 
Aristotle’s Generation of Animals is the transformation of an embryo into 
its adult form. And we explain that change, in part, by reference to the 
developmental capacities of organisms themselves. If we then ask what 
those developmental capacities consist in, we would expect Aristotle 
to point to certain lower-level structures that serve as the material base 
for those higher-level capacities (e.g., Meteorologica IV) just as modern 
biologists point to certain cellular and molecular structures. But, as we 
have just seen, that material base will itself be explained teleologically 
by reference to the higher-level capacities for whose sake they exist.
So if the vacuuity charge holds at all, it must be charge 5. Now to 
explain the development of an embryo into a living thing of such-and-
such a kind by referring to the actualization of a capacity to develop 
into a living thing of that kind certainly does sound vacuous, since the 
explanada includes reference to the explanandum. But not all causal 
powers are basic for Aristotle in the sense of being unanalyzable into 
further capacities.15 The capacity to develop into an organism of such-
and-such a kind is not an unanalyzable capacity. Rather, the Genera-
tion of Animals invokes a whole range of causal powers, including the 
capacity to transform uterine blood into various grades of nutriment, 
the capacity to transform those nutrients into tissues, bone structures 
and other ‘uniform’ parts, the capacity of certain materials to become 
membranous when acted on by heat, and so forth. Aristotle’s talk of 
‘nature’ as a cause of development gives way to a deeper explanation 
in terms of these kinds of causal powers, which together comprise the 
developmental capacities of living things.
15 Compare Lear (1991, 23-4), who sees the dunamis to produce the living thing as an 
unanalyzable power.
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Material and Formal Natures
In accordance with the theory set out in Physics Book II, Generation of 
Animals articulates an account of development where the process that 
transform the embryo into its adult state is portrayed as a complex di-
alectic between the organism’s formal nature and its material nature. 
The material nature of an organism is often taken to play a merely nega-
tive (some might say, nefarious) role in this process. For example, in the 
closing lines of Book IV Aristotle explains how the ‘indeterminacy’ of 
matter often impedes to the teleological efforts of the formal nature in 
the construction of an embryo:
Nature’s aim, then, is to measure the generations and completions of 
things by the numbers of these [sc. the periods of the heavenly bod-
ies], but it cannot do this accurately on account of the indeterminacy 
(aoristian) of the matter and the occurrence of many principles that 
impede natural generation and destruction and are so often the causes 
of things occurring contrary to nature. (GA IV 10, 778a5-9)
The most perceptible area where matter has this negative effect is in the 
occurrence of birth defects and other deformities. Thus, GA IV 4 tells us 
that monstrosities result when the formal nature (hê kata to eidos phusis) 
fails to control the material nature (tên kata tên hulên) (770b16-17). Of 
course even here the abnormality is, in a sense, in accordance with na-
ture (kata phusin), since the explanation for the monstrous result will still 
make reference to the nature of the organism understood in the material 
sense. Nevertheless, Aristotle insists that the cause of monsters is to be 
traced to the matter and not the form (cf. 770a4-8). According to Len-
nox, the teleological activities of the formal nature are also constrained 
by the material nature even in the normal cases. For Lennox this ‘gives 
material natures both a more independent and a more central role in 
Aristotelian science than is typically suggested.’16
However, material natures are not limited to this negative role in 
Aristotle’s account of natural generation; they also make a positive con-
tribution of their own.17 Consider the way Aristotle explains the forma-
16 Lennox 2001b, 183, 196.
17 See Leunissen (unpublished draft), who argues that the independent positive con-
tributions of the material nature have been generally neglected by commentators.
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tion of basic tissues such as fl esh and bone (the so-called uniform parts 
of animals) in GA II 6:
The formation of the uniform parts is effected by cold and heat. … 
As the nourishment oozes through the blood vessels and the pores 
in each one of them (just like water in unbaked pottery) the fl esh, or 
its analogue, is formed by being fused together by the cold, and for 
this reason it is dissolved by fi re. But of those constituents fl oating to 
the surface which have an excessively earthy nature (having but little 
moisture and heat in them), when these are being dried as the mois-
ture evaporates together with the heat, they are formed into parts that 
are hard and earthy in character (e.g., nails and horns and hooves and 
beaks). As such these can be softened by fi re though none of them can 
be melted by it, while some of them (e.g., eggshells) can be melted by 
fl uids. Both the sinews and the bones are formed by the internal heat 
as the fl uid substance is solidifi ed. For this reason, like earthenware, 
bones cannot be dissolved by fi re. For it is as though they are being 
baked in an oven by the heat involved in their formation. (743a3-20)
Aristotle announces at the outset of this passage that the uniform parts 
of animals are generated ‘by cold and heat’. What is distinctive about 
this section is that all of the explanations presented are couched ex-
clusively in terms of these material necessities independently of any 
reference to natural goals. However, Aristotle immediately qualifi es 
this (743a21-34) by claiming that reference to heat and cold alone can-
not explain why this amount of heating and cooling occurs at precisely 
this time in precisely this way, which is necessary to ensure a normal 
pattern of development. This is then followed by an attempt to locate 
those material-level accounts from 743a3-20 within a broader teleologi-
cal framework by suggesting that in the context of biological develop-
ment heating and cooling are ‘used’ by the organism’s formal nature 
for the sake of something:
Now cold is a privation of heat. And both of these are used by the 
nature <of the embryo> insofar as they have a capacity for making 
one thing this way and another that way from necessity; so that in the 
context of development at any rate it is for the sake of something that the 
heating and cooling of these and the formation of each of the parts 
takes place, the fl esh being made soft — heating and cooling making 
it such on the one hand from necessity and on the other hand for the 
sake of something — while sinew is made solid and elastic, and bone 
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solid and brittle. … We must state then, as we have said, that all of 
these things come into being on the one hand by necessity and on the 
other hand not by [that kind of] necessity but for the sake of some-
thing. (743a36-b8; cf. GA V 8, 789b6-9, PA III 2, 663b22-4)
Teleological explanations in Aristotle’s biology often have the pattern 
exhibited here, where some part X is said to come about both from ne-
cessity and for the sake of something. In such cases as these, the mate-
rial and formal nature of the organism interact to produce a functioning 
structure.
This general pattern is illustrated nicely at GA II 4, 739b26-32. Here 
Aristotle explains how protective membranes form around the outer 
surface of the embryo during the early stages of its development:
When the more solid portion comes together, the fl uid portion is sepa-
rated off from it, and as the earthy constituents solidify membranes 
form all around it. This occurs both from necessity and for the sake of 
something: from necessity, because the surface of a fl uid must solidify 
upon being heated as well as cooled; for the sake of something, because 
the embryo must not be in a liquid but must be separated from it.
The explanation works like this. On the one hand, the material nature 
of the embryo is such that, when exposed to heating and cooling, its 
surface must solidify resulting in membranes forming all around it. 
This is a case of straightforward material necessity. The dunameis of 
the factors involved (the active powers of hot and cold and the passive 
powers of fl uid substances) are such that their mutual interaction pro-
duces that specifi c effect (cf. Physics 198b12-14). It is as close as we get 
in Aristotle to a law of chemistry. On the other hand, experimental biol-
ogy shows us that developing embryos must be separated from their 
fl uid environments, if they are to reach maturity. As such, the presence 
of extraembryonic membranes is necessary, not in the sense that it fol-
lows directly from the laws of chemistry; rather, they are necessary if 
the embryo is going to survive. In other words, membranes are condi-
tionally necessary (or necessary ex hupothesis). It is important to stress 
that the former necessity — the fact that a fl uid substance necessarily 
solidifi es when exposed to heat and cold — is not an instance of con-
ditional necessity. The mechanical interactions between the materials 
involved are necessary independently of any developmental goals. (For 
example, this same ‘law of chemistry’ is invoked in the formation of 
the omentum at PA IV 3, 677b21-8, where it is not couched in terms of 
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conditional necessity.) What is conditionally necessary here is simply 
the presence of the membranes themselves. In the context of develop-
ment material necessity is often subordinated, but not always reducible, 
to conditional necessity.18
The dual-pattern of explanation in GA II 4, 739b26-32 is not a disjunc-
tive appeal to two alternative ways of accounting for the same phenom-
enon, one that invokes the necessity rooted in the organism’s material 
nature versus one that invokes fi nal causation rooted in its formal na-
ture. Rather, ‘necessity’ and ‘for the sake of something’ form two parts 
of a single, unifi ed explanation. The teleological principle invoked at 
GA II 6, 743a36-b8 adds an important element to the story because it 
tells us how the two parts of such explanations are tied together. Mate-
rial forces, such as heat and cold, have the capacity to necessitate cer-
tain changes in virtue their own natures. In the context of development, 
these necessities are exploited by the embryo’s formal nature in order 
to bring about certain teleological goals (‘it is for the sake of something 
that the heating and cooling of these and the formation of each of the parts 
takes place’). Applied to our example, the embryo’s formal nature uses 
the necessity associated with its material nature (the fact that the outer 
surface of a fl uid substance must solidify and become membranous 
when exposed to heating and cooling) in order to secure the goal of 
separating it from its fl uid environment, which it must be if it is to sur-
vive to maturity.
So rather than merely hindering development or constraining the 
actions of the formal nature in some way, the capacity of an organism’s 
material nature to necessitate certain changes can be co-opted by the ac-
tivities of its formal nature to secure developmental goals. As Aristotle 
puts it, the material nature supplies both the matter and the ‘tools’ for 
the formation of essential parts (GA V 8, 789b6-9). This helps to improve 
our understanding of the role that material natures play in Aristotle’s 
biology. It also helps to bolster the case against so-called heuristic (or 
Kantian) readings of Aristotelian teleology by putting us in a better po-
sition to see exactly why Aristotle thinks teleology is an ineliminable 
feature of the living world. In the context of natural generation, at least, 
since the changes arising from the embryo’s material nature are, to a 
large extent, regulated and structured by its formal nature for the sake 
of an end, we cannot eliminate fi nal causation from the world without 
18 For a good discussion of the difference between material and conditional necessity, 
see Leunissen (unpublished).
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fundamentally changing the way things turn out. There would not be 
a world populated by complex organisms whose parts are adapted for 
specifi c ways of life.
It is not the case, however, that all of the motions and changes aris-
ing from the material nature are subordinated to teleology in this way. 
In the development of living things, the material nature makes a posi-
tive contribution of its own that can be understood entirely indepen-
dently of the teleological actions of formal natures. This is the main 
thrust of Leunissen’s paper. As Leunissen shows, in many cases both 
the raw materials and the parts formed out of those materials come to 
be through non-teleological necessity. In many cases parts will be made 
from raw materials that result from certain other material constituents 
behaving according to their own natures (e.g., horns, PA III 2, 663b25-
35; eye-brows, PA II 15, 658b14-25).19 And in the Parts of Animals Aristo-
tle speaks of a number of parts (e.g., the omentum) that are completely 
formed as a result of material necessity alone. Once formed, these part 
are used by the organism’s formal nature for a good end. But they did 
not come to be for that end, since the formal nature is not involved in 
their construction (PA IV 3, 677b21-8).
The analysis of Aristotelian natures offered in this paper plays an 
important role in understanding Aristotle’s account of variation. As we 
shall see, by analyzing forms in terms of formal natures and formal na-
tures in terms of causal powers we are in a better position to ask wheth-
er variations among species members are ultimately due to the form or 
the matter of the individual. This sheds important light on the issue of 
whether or not Aristotle believed in so-called individual forms.
Are Formal Natures species- or individual-specifi c?
Commentators on Aristotle have typically held that the form transmit-
ted to the offspring in the act of reproduction includes only those fea-
tures that are common to the species. Those features that distinguish 
one species member from another are accidental and result either from 
the species-form being embodied in different quantities of matter or 
from certain environmental infl uences impeding the perfect replication 
of that form. In the 1980s a series of papers came out that challenged 
19 This is what Lennox (2001b, 187) calls ‘pre-conditional necessity’, which is entirely 
dependent on the animal’s material nature.
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this traditional view of Aristotelian form by showing that the form at 
work in natural generation (according to the Generation of Animals) is 
not a generic species form but a sub-specifi c form that incorporates 
features peculiar to the organism whose forms it is.20 On this reading, 
living forms are individual in the sense that they contain within them-
selves variations below the level of species.
Despite marshalling in an impressive body of textual evidence, nei-
ther paper managed to convince the general populace that, for Aristot-
le, living forms include more than what is common to the members of a 
species. The view that forms are species-specifi c remains the dominant 
interpretation in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. For example, 
Sharples (2005) argues:
Nevertheless, it seems that both for Aristotle and for Alexander there 
is in principle a distinction between what is essential to every member 
of a species and what is not, the latter being accidents due to the mat-
ter of each individual. … A species is the group of individuals…each 
of which is defi ned by, and indeed given being by, the presence in 
it of the form of that type of thing. Aristotle can certainly use  
extensionally of a collection of individuals, but this use may be de-
rivative, in the sense that it is the  in the sense of form that makes 
the individuals a group in the fi rst place. Conversely, the features that 
distinguish one member of a species from another are accidents due 
to the matter and therefore in principle irrelevant to Aristotelian sci-
ence. There is no knowledge, in the sense of scientifi c knowledge and 
understanding, of what is accidental; knowledge is related to essence 
and purpose.21
The implication of this view, Sharples adds, is that ‘many of the features 
of individuals will be outside the scope of biology as a formal science.’22 
20 See especially Balme 1987 and Cooper 1988. This view, which claims that biological 
forms include features below the level of species (e.g., differences in eye colour), 
should be distinguished from the position, defended by Frede and Patzig (1988), 
that forms of particular organisms are themselves particular (numerically distinct, 
non-repeatable instances) rather than universals. The idea that Aristotelian forms 
are particulars is compatible with the traditional view that such forms are generic 
species forms. Paul Studtmann (this volume) discusses ‘particular forms’ in this 
sense.
21 Sharples 2005, 104-5
22 Sharples 2005, 106
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Sharples argues that the view that Aristotelian forms are universal — in 
the sense that they exclude ‘all peculiarities below the level of species’ 
— refl ects a deeper continuity between Aristotle and Plato, where the 
notion of form is much better suited to the precision of mathematics 
than the complexities of biology.23
The tendency of scholars to ignore the evidence of GA is puzzling. 
Aristotle’s remarks on inheritance really do seem to support the more 
radical notion of individual forms. Part of the problem I think is that 
defenders of this view tended to emphasize the wrong portions of text. 
For example, the passage that most took to support individual forms 
reads as follows:
What is distinctive (idion) and individual (kath hekeston) always exerts 
a stronger infl uence relative to generation. For Coriscus is both a hu-
man being and an animal; but human is closer to what is distinctive 
of him than is animal. And both the individual and the kind gener-
ate, but more so the individual; for this is the substance (hê ousia). For 
while the offspring also comes to be a certain quality, at the same time 
it comes to be a this something, and this is the substance. (GA IV 3, 
767b29-35)
Many took this passage to be saying that what is distinctive and par-
ticular about the individual generator always exerts the strongest infl u-
ence over the process of generation, which accounts for the fact that 
offspring tend to resemble their parents more than other members of 
the same species. Yet all this passage need be asserting — one might 
object — is that particular substances like Socrates and Coriscus are the 
things that engage in reproduction not universals like human and ani-
mal, which Metaphysics Z 15 denies are substances at all. On this read-
ing the passage does not commit Aristotle to the notion of individual 
forms.24
Whatever we make of this text, I believe the more compelling evi-
dence comes from the surrounding passage, which has gone virtually 
unnoticed in the debate over individual forms:
23 Sharples 2005, 107
24 This reading was suggested to me by Chris Shields and Meg Scharle at the Alaska 
workshop. However, notice that this passage says that both the individual and the 
kind (= universals, cf. 768a13) exert a generative infl uence. The point is simply that 
the individual exerts more infl uence (alla mallon to kath’ hekaston).
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I speak of each dunamis in the following sense. The generator [to gen-
nôn] is not only a male but also a particular sort of male, e.g., a Coris-
cus or a Socrates, and it is not only a Coriscus but also a human being. 
And it is in this sense that, of the characteristics that belong to the gen-
erator insofar as it is capable of generating [katho gennêtikon] and not 
incidentally [kata sumbebêkos] (e.g. if it is a scholar or someone’s neigh-
bour), some belong to it more closely while others more remotely. … 
So, there are kinêseis present in the seeds of animals derived from the 
dunameis of all of these sorts of things [sc. ‘male’, ‘Socrates’, ‘human’], 
and in potentiality even those of its ancestors, although those of the 
individual are always closer. (GA IV 3, 767b23-768a2)
This passage tells us two important things about the metaphysics of 
generation. First, it draws a distinction between the heritable properties 
of an individual (those that belong to the generator katho gennêtikon) 
and what we might call its genetically incidental properties (those that 
are kata sumbebêkos). The examples of genetically incidental properties 
are being a good scholar and being someone’s neighbour. These prop-
erties are incidental to the generator qua generator, not because they 
fail to be universal, but because they are not passed on in the act of 
reproduction (they are not heritable). What this passage makes clear 
is that some variation within a species is heritable. As Aristotle puts it, 
some individual differences are among the properties that belong to the 
generator ‘insofar as it is capable of generation’ (katho gennêtikon).
Aristotle never says exactly which individual differences he has in 
mind here. He only mentions properties that make the generator ‘a Co-
riscus or a Socrates’ as opposed to simply ‘a human being’). For the sake 
of argument I will treat their particular shade of eye colour and particu-
lar nose shapes as features that belong to each of them katho gennêtikon 
(as heritable differences). Whatever features Aristotle ultimately has in 
mind is irrelevant, though, since he is clear that some sub-specifi c dif-
ferences are among those that belong to the generator katho gennêtikon.
The other thing of interest in this passage is the use of the concept 
dunamis.25 Aristotle tells us that there are kinêseis, or ‘movements’, in the 
reproductive materials of organisms whose function is to transmit their 
heritable (gennêtikon) traits. These movements are said to be derived 
from (apo) a corresponding series of dunameis for just those traits. Now 
25 The following is based on ideas developed in Henry 2006.
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it is reasonable to suppose that these dunameis refer to particular de-
velopmental capacities. On this reading, these dunameis constitute that 
inner source of change (or ‘nature’) that controls the embryo’s develop-
ment into its adult form.
This hereditary concept of a dunamis is meant to provide the onto-
logical basis for the distinction Aristotle draws in our passage between 
features that belong to an organism katho gennêtikon and those that are 
kata sumbebêkos. Unlike genetically incidental traits, each heritable fea-
ture of an organism can be traced to a corresponding dunamis in its 
generative nature, which is a capacity for the formation of just that trait. 
In this way GA 767b23-8a2 can be seen as an attempt to isolate the more 
precise (effi cient) causes of reproduction: the dunameis are the causal 
entities behind the heritable features enumerated in that passage.26
Putting these two ideas together, what the offspring receives from 
its parents in the act of reproduction is a series of dunameis, or devel-
opmental capacities, for different parts of its body. These dunameis 
are transmitted directly from parent to child via a series of kinêseis, or 
‘movements’, carried in its spermatic material. Contrary to the tradi-
tional view, our passage extends this mechanism to include, not only 
the transmission of those dunameis that belong to Socrates as a human 
being, but those that are distinctive of him as a particular human being 
(e.g. his snub-nose and blue eyes). If this is right, then the generative 
natures of organisms must include dunameis for both individual- and 
species-level properties.
It is a short step from this to the notion of individual forms. For these 
dunameis are surely part of Socrates’ formal nature: they are capacities 
of his generative soul.27 It follows from this that Socrates’ form will be 
different from Callias’ form insofar as his generative soul includes ca-
pacities for developing particularly Socratic (as opposed to Calliastic) 
features, such as a snub nose and bulging blue eyes. It is in this sense 
that Socrates form is individual: Socrates’ generative soul does not just 
26 This reading of dunamis is also defended in Morsink 1982. For the idea that a sci-
ence must attempt to identify the ‘more precise’ causes of a phenomenon see Phys-
ics II 3, 195b21-5.
27 In de Anima II 4 Aristotle says that generative soul is essentially the capacity to re-
produce the form and ousia of the individual in a different material body (415a26-
8), while nutritive soul is the capacity to maintain that form and ousia in the same 
body (416b3-24). While both capacities belong to the same part of the soul, the 
reproductive capacity is primary (416b24-6).
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include dunameis for parts of a human being but more specifi c dunameis 
for parts of a particular kind of human being, namely, a Socrates. These 
more specifi c dunameis (dunameis for resemblances that are peculiar to 
Socrates) are not found in Callias’ generative soul.28
Before moving on I want to say a word about Aristotle’s use of the 
plural dunameis (and the corresponding kinêseis) in our passage. The 
plural raises important questions about the modularity of develop-
ment. Certainly, the fact that organisms are not simply collections of 
parts but unifi ed wholes suggests that their generative natures must 
also be unities of some kind and not merely a collection of independent 
developmental capacities for independent parts. At the same time, it is 
unclear from the text of the GA just how far Aristotle is willing to accept 
this non-modular conception of development. But however Aristotle 
ultimately answers this question (Do generative natures have ‘parts’?), 
it is at least clear that for the purposes of discussing inheritance he 
thinks it is useful to talk about distinct capacities for the development of 
different traits. For among the phenomena he thinks his account must 
be able to explain is the fact that offspring can resemble different family 
members in respect to different parts (767b1-2). To explain this Aristotle 
posits different dunameis for different parts of the parent, which can be 
inherited more or less independently of the others. For example, af-
ter describing how resemblance to the whole is accomplished Aristotle 
says:
The same course of events also applies in the case of the parts. For of-
ten some of the parts resemble the father, some the mother, and some 
one of the ancestors. For the movements of the parts are also present 
in <the sperma> in activity and in potentiality, as has often been said. 
(768b1-4)
Given the suggestion at 767b23-8a2, presumably these ‘movements 
of the parts’ will also be drawn from dunameis corresponding to those 
parts. So while the formal nature of an organism will constitute a unity 
28 Aristotle does say on many occasions (in both the Metaphysics and the biology) 
that Socrates and Callias are ‘one in form’. And Generation of Animals V 1 is clear 
that ‘the account of the substantial being’ (logos tês ousias) of an organism does not 
include features that are peculiar to it as an individual (e.g., eye colour in humans). 
For a way to read this idea that is consistent with my interpretation see Lennox 
2001b, 174-7.
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of some kind (that phusis is itself a single, unifi ed dunamis for the forma-
tion of a single organism), it can be understood as a unifi ed complex of 
various developmental capacities.29
Heritable variations like eye colour and nose shape occupy an in-
teresting place in Aristotle’s ontology. First of all, they are not mate-
rial accidents or incidental by-products of changes aimed at other ends. 
What allows us to say that some developmental process P is internally 
directed towards its outcome X (according to Aristotle) is the fact that 
P is the actualization of a dunamis for X, where X is the per se object of 
that dunamis. Some other outcome Y might also result from the actual-
ization that same dunamis, but Y is considered incidental to P (since P 
is the actualization of a dunamis for X not Y). I will not attempt a full 
defense of this here. The point is that we can identify which outcomes 
are developmental goals and which are incidental by-products of the 
changes leading up to them by identifying which dunameis are at work 
in the process.30
There is good reason to think that all the dunameis mentioned in 
GA 767b23-8a2 are per se effi cient causes of the traits associated with 
them. On this reading, all of those individual differences that belong 
to Socrates katho gennêtikon (those corresponding to the dunamis for 
‘Socrates’) will come to be as part of a continuous actualization of a sin-
gle dunamis for a human being with just those features. If this is right, 
then those individual differences will not count as material accidents; 
for there is nothing accidental about them. Like Socrates’ species-level 
properties, the presence of his individual features can be traced to a set 
of dunameis for just those ends.31
29 The modularity question arose at the Second Workshop on the Generation of Ani-
mals (Pittsburgh 2006). There was no consensus about the import of the plural 
dunameis (and kinêseis) in GA IV 3; however, there was a strong feeling among 
the participants that they must constitute a unity of some kind. I am convinced 
by Lennox’s 1982 view (reprinted in 2001b, 248n41) that development involves 
an ‘integrated series of potentials [dunameis]’ rather than ‘an irreducible potential 
for form’. (Lennox has since denounced that view on several occasions [personal 
correspondence].) This does not mean that the product of development must be a 
mere aggregrate of features. As I see it, modularity comes in degrees, and the text 
of the GA does not give us any indication as to how non-modular Aristotle thinks 
development is.
30 Gotthelf 1989, 115-16
31 Being ‘accidental’ (kata sumbebêkos) has two senses in Aristotle. Something can be 
accidental in a causal sense of being the incidental by-product of a series of chang-
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Yet, the fact that heritable variations are the intrinsic or per se objects 
of a set of developmental capacities does not mean that those features 
are present in the organism for the sake of anything. For Aristotle is 
equally clear in Book V that no variations below the level of species are 
subject to teleological explanations. (The reasons for this are complex 
and outside the limits of this paper.) At the outset of Book V Aristotle 
tells us that those features which are neither common products of ani-
mal natures nor distinctive of some particular kind of animal neither 
are nor come to be for the sake of anything (778a30-3). Eyes are com-
mon products of animal natures, while wings and feathers are features 
that are distinctive of some particular kind of animal. Eye colour in hu-
mans, on the other hand, would be an example of a heritable difference 
that satisfi es neither of these two conditions. For not all humans have 
eyes that are the same colour. Thus, while the eyes might be present for 
the sake of something, their particular colouring is not.
The existence of heritable variations (individual differences that can 
be traced to a dunamis in the organism’s formal nature) thus suggests 
that being the intrinsic object of a dunamis is not suffi cient for teleolo-
gy.32 If this is right, then heritable variations occupy an interesting place 
es aimed at some other end. Or it can can be accidental in the logical sense that is 
opposed to being essential. Those individual features that belong to Socrates katho 
gennêtikon are accidental in the logical sense (though qua human not qua genera-
tor!) but not in the former sense (since each one is the per se object of a correspond-
ing dunamis).
32 This is at least a necessary condition. For example, if eyes were the incidental by-
product of a series of changes aimed at other ends, then there would be no sense in 
which eyes are present for the sake of seeing. Sight would not be part of the causal 
story that explains why animals come to have eyes. And I have argued that being 
the per se object of a corresponding dunamis is what distinguishes the ‘intended’ 
result of a process from those results that are incidental by-products of the changes 
leading up to them. Gotthelf argues that teleological explanations are sanctioned 
only when what is being actualized is a dunamis for a complex outcome that is not 
ontologically reducible to a sum of actualizations of a series of dunameis traceable 
to the organism’s material (‘elemental’) nature (e.g., 1989, 113). Gotthelf could hold 
that the dunamis for ‘human’ (and ‘male’?) in our focal passage is an irreducible po-
tential for form in this sense, while the dunamis for ‘Socrates’ is reducible to a series 
of elemental dunameis. Although I remain attracted to Gotthelf’s interpretation of 
teleology, the text at GA 767b23-8a2 does not invite this distinction. On my read-
ing, all the individual differences that belong to Socrates katho gennêtikon (those 
corresponding to the dunamis for ‘Socrates’) come to be as part of a continuous ac-
tualization of a single dunamis for a human being with just those Socratic features. 
But those individual differences will not be present for the sake of anything.
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in Aristotle’s ontology: family resemblances are neither accidental by-
products (since they are heritable) nor are they present for the sake of 
anything (since they are sub-specifi c).
Species natures
In addition to organismal natures, there is some evidence in the biology 
that Aristotle might also have a concept of species natures. In GA V 6 
Aristotle introduces a series of distinctions in order to explain changes 
of colouring among animals. First, a given species of animals can be 
monochromatic or polychromatic.33 It is monochromatic if all the mem-
bers naturally have the same colouring (e.g., all lions are naturally taw-
ny, all ravens black, all polar bears white),34 while it is polychromatic 
if its members do not all have the same colouring (e.g., some pigeons 
are naturally grey, while others are naturally white). In addition, Ar-
istotle distinguishes between being totichromatic (or whole-coloured, 
holokhroma) and being variegated (poikila). Being totichromatic means 
that the body of the animal is all one colour (e.g., a panther is entirely 
black), while an individual is variegated if its body is not all the same 
colour (e.g., leopards are spotted).
Part of the work being done by these distinctions is that it allows Ar-
istotle to talk about the way the colouring of a species can change over 
time. Aristotle is not interested in changes in an individual’s colouring 
over its life-span but changes in the colour of the population itself:
Change of colour is much more common among totichromatic animals 
than among monochromatic ones, both in cases where a simple colour 
changes into another simple colour (e.g. ,white animals produce black 
33 Each of these is said to be a feature of the genos; however, in the present context 
genos should be taken to refer to a continuous ancestor-descendent line (see Meta-
physics 28; compare De Queiroz 2007), i.e. a reproducing species. For an explicit 
use of genos as species see GA IV 3, 767b9-10.
34 Aristotle does recognize that a species that is naturally monochromatic might con-
tain individuals that are not the same colour as the rest of the population; for ex-
ample, there may be white ravens. However, as he goes on to explain (see below), 
in these rare cases the colour of the individual is an unnatural ‘affection’ caused 
by some sort of disorder (e.g., albinism). So being monochromatic does not require 
that every single individual is the same colour only that the members are the same 
colour ‘by nature’.
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ones and black ones produce white ones) and in cases where mixtures 
are produced from both of them. The reason for this is that not having 
a single colour is present in the nature of the whole kind (en têi phusei 
to holô i tôi genei). For being easily changed (eukinêton) in both direc-
tions belongs to the kind, so that there are more instances of changing 
into one another and of being variegated. Monochromatic kinds are 
the opposite of this. For they do not change except owing to some 
affection, and this is rare (instances of a white partridge, raven, spar-
row, and bear have been observed). These happen when there is some 
disturbance in the process of development. For what is small is easily 
destroyed and easily changed, and what is coming to be is of this sort. 
For the origin is located in something small in things that come into 
being. (GA V 6, 785b27-6a2)
Natural changes in the colouring of a population are said to occur more 
frequently among the totiochromatic-polychromatic kinds, those whose 
members have single-coloured bodies though not all members have the 
same colour of body (e.g., humans, oxen, pigeons). The reason, Aris-
totle says, is that it is in the nature of these kinds not to have a single 
colour. This makes the population susceptible to change (eukinêton), so 
that we tend to fi nd more varieties of colour and more instances of co-
lour change from one generation to the next.
What is striking about this passage is that it invokes ‘the phusis of the 
genos’ to explain why the colouring of some species is ‘easily changed 
(eukinêton) in both directions’. This is striking because Aristotle seems 
to be ascribing a single nature to the species itself, which is the source of 
its tendency to change colour. There are two ways to read this remark, 
depending on how one views the ontological status of Aristotelian spe-
cies.
One might argue that Aristotelian kinds are just not the sorts of things 
that can have natures in the strict sense. Natures are internal principles 
of movement and change belonging to primary substances. And only 
organisms are substances in this sense; the kinds to which they belong 
(species and genera) are either not substances at all (Metaphysics Z 15) 
or secondary substances that are ontologically parasitic on individuals 
(Categories 5). This suggests a defl ationary reading of the text. Talk of 
a species nature here is simply a generalization over the particular na-
tures of the members of that species. Drawing on the discussion in GA 
IV 3, what Aristotle seems to be saying is that the generative natures of 
different individuals within the kind contain dunameis for different co-
lours. This is why the colour of the population is easily changed: there 
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is an abundance of heritable variation. By contrast, the natures of indi-
viduals in monochromatic species (e.g., ravens, panthers) all contain 
dunameis for the same colour. As such, any change in the population 
must arise from an unnatural affection of some kind owing to a distur-
bance in the process of generation.35
This may be the way Aristotle intends us to read this passage. How-
ever, there is a more interesting reading that takes Aristotle’s talk of 
species natures seriously. First of all, Aristotle says that it is the nature 
of the species not to have a single colour. One might argue that the 
property Aristotle ascribes to the species here cannot be reduced to the 
properties of the organisms that comprise the species. For each particu-
lar organism is ‘totichromatic’, which means it naturally develops and 
maintains only one colour (e.g., a ox born grey remains grey for its life). 
In the same way being eukinêton, of which this phusis is the source, is not 
reducible to the natures of individual organisms.36
Now, since Aristotelian ‘natures’ are internal principles of change 
belonging to individual substances, if species really do have natures of 
their own, then Aristotle must be thinking of them as individuals rather 
than classes.37 While I am not sure this is the case for Aristotle, let me 
offer some textual evidence to motivate this reading. In Parts of Animals 
I 2-4, for example, Aristotle appears to treat infi ma species as particular 
individuals: they are the kath’ hekesta that we are attempting to grasp 
through defi nition.38 On this view of species, individuals like Socrates 
and Callias are parts of a more inclusive individual (the human species) 
rather than members of a wider class (the class of all humans). Now one 
of the marks of being individual substance is possessing unity through 
time, or diachronic unity. What unifi es a species individual in this way? 
35 This argument follows the lead of Lennox 2001b, 184.
36 The reading of species natures developed here might also be extended to Aristot-
le’s discussion of bees in GA III 10. For example, at 760a12-14 Aristotle attributes 
the fact that the generation of bees is ‘arranged in a sort of proportionate series’, 
which ensures that the three varieties (genê) of bee (king, worker, drone) ‘continue 
forever in existence and none of them fails’, to the activity of hê phusis. This or-
derly arrangement of generation seems to be a species-level property that cannot 
be traced to the phusis of any particular bee in the species.
37 This view would have real contemporary relevance (Hull 1976, Ghiselin 1997).
38 See Lennox 2001a, 153: ‘‘The particular’ (kath’ hekaston) is used by Aristotle to refer 
both to individuals [sc. organisms] and to the most determinate forms of a kind; 
here [sc. 642b6-7] the latter use is to the fore.’
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Reproductive continuity. The primary defi nition of a genos in Metaphysics 
 28 is ‘a continuous generation of organisms of the same form’. On 
this model species turn out to be individuals whose parts are unifi ed 
through formal replication.
Individuals also have functional unity; they are integrated wholes. 
And there is some suggestion that Aristotelian species do possess this 
kind of unity. The parts of an Aristotelian species (the individual organ-
isms) constitute a single, unifi ed whole if and only if they all contribute 
to a common function (see Metaphysics ##, ## [REFERENCE NEED-
ED]). What is this common function? There is at least one place where 
Aristotle seems to suggest that the different parts of a species — specifi -
cally, its males and females — exist for the sake of its preservation. In 
GA IV 3 Aristotle explicitly says that males and females are necessary 
because ‘the species must be kept in being’ (767b8-10). On this reading, 
then, the parts of a species are tied together through reproduction (dia-
chronic unity) and by this one common function (functional unity).
Summary Conclusion
In this paper I set out to explore Aristotle’s concept of organismal na-
tures as it is deployed in his biological writings by focusing on the role 
of nature understood ‘as mover’ in Aristotle’s account of animal gener-
ation. We can gather the arguments of the paper into fi ve main claims:
1) Aristotle’s concept of organismal nature picks out some-
thing complex: it is a complex of a material nature and a formal 
nature. The generation of an organism arises from the inter-
action between these two natures, where necessities arising 
from the material nature are often used by the formal nature 
as ‘tools’ for bringing about certain teleological goals (GA II 6, 
743a36-b8; V 8, 789b2-15).
2) Reference to a thing’s nature is not explanatorily basic; 
talk of nature can be understood in terms of Aristotle’s more 
fundamental theory of dunameis or causal powers (Metaphysics 
Θ 8, 1049b9-11). This makes Aristotle’s developmental biology 
scientifi cally respectable from a modern perspective, whereas 
it would not be if he invoked the concept of organismal natures 
without the theory of causal powers in the background.
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3) The formal nature at work in generation is a unifi ed com-
plex of independently heritable dunameis, which include capac-
ities to develop both species- and individual-level properties 
(GA IV 3, 767b23-8a2). Thus formal natures are in a sense ‘per-
sonalized’. For example, Socrates’ generative nature includes 
a set of capacities for developing particularly Socratic (as op-
posed to Calliastic) features, such as a snub nose and bulging 
blue eyes.39
4) Heritable variations, such as eye colour and nose shape, 
occupy an interesting place in Aristotle’s ontology: they are not 
accidental by-products of development, since each one is the 
per se object of a corresponding dunamis (GA IV 3); yet they not 
present for the sake of anything, since they are sub-specifi c (GA 
V 1). The existence of heritable variations thus shows that being 
the intrinsic object of a dunamis is not suffi cient for teleology.
5) There is some evidence that Aristotle invokes the concept 
of a species nature to explain certain species-level properties, 
such as the tendency of a species to change its colour over suc-
cessive generations (GA IV 6, 785b27-6a2).
Claims 3 and 5 are likely to be the most controversial. I have tried to 
show how claim 3 (specifi cally the commitment to individual formal 
natures) follows directly from Aristotle’s hereditary use of the concept 
of dunamis in Generation of Animals IV 3. This concept is meant to pro-
vide the ontological basis for the distinction he draws between features 
that belong to an organism ‘katho gennêtikon’ (which includes individual 
features) and those that are ‘kata sumbebêkos’. Claim 5 is more tentative, 
and I am not aware of anyone who has suggested this radical interpre-
tation. Admittedly, the evidence for this is weak; I know of no any other 
texts that support it. And so in the end the defl ationary reading of ‘en 
têi phusei to holô i tôi genei’ may be preferable. On this reading, Aristotle’s 
reference to species-level natures is reducible to the natures of the or-
ganisms that comprise a species.
I myself have been attracted to the view (defended by Lennox) that 
Aristotle does not extend teleology beyond the actions of individual 
39 This is not to suggest that the products of these capacities (e.g. eye colour) are part 
of an organism’s substantial being (cf. GA V 1, 778a32-b1) but only the dunameis 
themselves, which I take to be capacities of generative soul.
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natures, even to the point where I doubt Aristotle would accept cases of 
what modern biology calls ‘co-adaptions’ (e.g., the co-adaption between 
insects and fl owering plants). Nevertheless, the possibility that Aristo-
tle invokes a concept of species-level natures over and above organis-
mal-level natures remains an interesting idea and deserves to be taken 
seriously. The price to be paid for this reading is that one must show 
that Aristotelian species are individuals in the way that organisms are 
individuals, since only individuals can have natures (understood as an 
inner source of change). Yet in the Politics Aristotle has no trouble see-
ing the polis as an individual with human beings as its parts. The polis, 
Aristotle says, is a product of nature and prior to the individual citizen; 
for the latter, when isolated from the polis, is not self-suffi cient and is 
therefore like a part in relation to the whole body (Politics I 2; compare 
Metaphysics Z 16). So it may not be much of a stretch for Aristotle to 
treat certain biological groups as individuals with natures of their own 
and organisms as their parts.40
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